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THE NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE DEMAND
OF

AWARD
BOVIS LEND LEASE FOR AN ARBITRATION
OF A JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE BETWEEN THE
ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS LOCAL 1 -ANDTHE OPERATING ENGINEER LOCAL 14

-X

Under Article

IV of the New

York Plan and based on the

evidence adduced at a hearing on October 14, 2005, I find that
Boris Lend Lease
there

is

a

Constructors
the

jurisdictional

dispute

between

the

Elevator

Local 1 and the Operating Engineers Local 14 over

operation

personnel

("Employer") has established, prima facie, that

of construction

elevators carrying material

and

at the Gramercy Park Hotel construction

site in New

evidence

both

York City.
The

adduced

shows

that

because

Unions

disputed and declined to comply with the orders of the Employer's
Superintendent regarding which elevators were to be used to hoist
material

and which

elevator

was

to

be

used

for personnel

used

"in

tandem"

(and when
for

both

a particular
purposes)

a

cessation of work took place on October 7, 2005 for a period of
time from 20 minutes to ^ and hour.
As part of the cessation of work at the instructions of a Union
representative and in contravention of the managerial authority
of the Employer, material which had been hoisted to the

7th

Floor was returned by an operator to the ground floor for

rehoisting in the way the Union(s) wanted it done.

This not only

disrupted

impermissible

and

delayed

construction,

but

was

an

"self-help" act in violation of the dispute settlement procedures
of

the

collective

bargaining

agreement(s)

and

constituted

"a

delay in work" and a "withholding of labor" within the meaning of
Article IV of the Plan.
Additionally,

because

Union

representative(s)

apparently

instructed their members

(the elevator operators) not to comply

with

the

the

orders

Superintendent

of

Employer's

Superintendent,

the

had to warn those operators that they would be

fired if they persisted in defying his instructions.
As a result, at present, the elevators are being operated
pursuant to the Superintendent's orders.
However,

in view

of

the

October

7th

work

stoppage, the

obvious dispute between the two Unions regarding which and when
each is to operate elevators, and the disciplinary warnings, it
is probable that unless the jurisdictional

issue

is resolved,

another cessation or interruption of construction work will again
occur.
Therefore, to avoid a repetition of an action by either or
both Unions that would "delay the work" or cause the "withholding
of labor," this dispute between the two Unions should be

submitted

to

arbitration

under

the

New

York

Plan

for

the

Settlement of jurisdictional Disputes.

Eric Jjr Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

October 20, 2005

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

THE NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
ARCHITECTURAL & ORNAMENTAL IRON
WORKERS NO. 580

OPINION AND AWARD

-and-

NYC DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS
-X

The

jurisdictional

dispute

in

this

case

involves

the

installation of steel roll up doors at the Staten Island Transfer
Station - Rt. 440 and Victory Boulevard.
A hearing was held before an Arbitration Panel on January
31, 2005.

The Panel consisted of the Undersigned as Chairman,

and Messers. Todd Nugent and Harry Weidmeyer, Members.

At the hearing, representatives of Local 580 appeared.

No

representative of the Carpenters Union appeared, dispute due and
lawful notice to the Carpenters of the scheduled hearing.
The Panel directed that the arbitration proceed, and the
proofs and allegations of Local 580 were heard.
The record before the Panel, including the minutes of the
preceding

mediation

session,

discloses

that

the

Carpenters

acknowledged and conceded that the work in dispute falls within
the jurisdiction of Local 580.

(Hence the obvious reason for the

decision of the Carpenters Union not to appear at the arbitration
hearing - namely that it does not dispute Local 580's claim for
the work).
The

testimony

and evidence adduced by

Local

580 at the

hearing fully support and affirm Local 580's jurisdiction over
the work of installing steel role up doors:

It has been doing

that work exclusively since at least 1967 in the Greater New York
geographical area.

Other affiliates of the Iron Workers have

performed that work exclusively elsewhere in the United States,
particularly in Los Angeles, Las Vegas.

There is no evidence

that this type of work has been done anywhere by the Carpenters
Union.
Under the New York Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional
Disputes, the decision of the Panel is to be based on "prevailing
practice in the Greater New York geographical area" if there are
otherwise
Agreements.

no

binding

Green

Book

decisions

or

International

Here there are no relevant Green Book decisions or

International Agreements between these trades.

But Local 580 has

clearly established a prevailing practice of doing the work in
the Greater New York geographic area that is determinative of
this case.
Together with the supporting testimony of the president of
McKean Rolling Steel Doors, Inc. Local 580 introduced an exhibit

showing its performance of that work at some 29 significant work
locations in the Greater New York geographical area.
For the foregoing

reasons, the Panel makes the

following

Award:
The installation of steel roll up doors at
the Staten Island Transfer Station - Rt. 440
and Victory Boulevard is work that belongs to
Local 580, Architectural & Ornamental Iron
Workers.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
DATED:

February 4, 2005

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL NO. 369 UTILITY WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO

AWARD
P&M GRIEVANCE #6338

-andENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
-X

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration in the above matter, having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:

The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by not making ROBERT BAILEY,
DARRELL BAKER, PAUL CORCORAN, JOHN IRVINE, GENE
KAISER and ALEXANDER ROBERTSON permanent on the
rating of Lead Nuclear Maintenance Mechanic as
contended by the Union in P&M Grievance No. 6338
dated June 22, 2001.

Eric jy^chmertz,Chairman
STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss :
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Edward R. Harriman, Jr.
Concurring
STATE OF

)
ss :

COUNTY OF

)

I, Edward R. Harriman, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my
Oath as Concurring that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

William Carr
Dissenting
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
SS :
)

I, William Carr do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Dissenting that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL NO. 369 UTILITY WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
P&M GRIEVANCE #6338

-and-

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did
the
Company
violate
the collective
bargaining
agreement
by
not
making
the
grievants permanent on the rating of Lead
Nuclear Maintenance Mechanic as contended by
the Union in P&M Grievance No. 6338, dated
June 22, 2001:
The grievants are ROBERT
BAILEY, DARRELL BAKER, PAUL CORCORAN, JOHN
IRVINE, GENE KAISER and ALEXANDER ROBERTSON.
Hearings were held on September 10, 2003 and February 11,
2004, before a tripartite Board of Arbitration.

Messrs. William

Carr and Edward R. Harriman, Jr. served respectively as the Union
and Company designees on that Board.
Chairman.

The Undersigned

served as

Representatives of the above-named Union and Company

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The oath of

the Arbitrators was waived, a stenographic record of the hearings
taken and post-hearing briefs were filed by both sides after the
first and second hearings.
The

Board

of Arbitration met

in executive

session

twice,

following the first hearing and again after the second hearing;
in each instance following receipt of the hearing transcripts and
the briefs.

What is in dispute is the applicability and interpretation
of Article XIX Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement,
Article V of the Non-Exempt position Specification for the job
Lead Nuclear Maintenance Mechanic of January 22, 1997 and Section
(c) Memorandum

of Agreement,

Lead

Maintenance

Mechanic, dated

January 17, 1997.
Respectively those cited Articles and Sections read:
Article XIX Section 3:
3.

An employee cemporarily upgraded for a
continuous period of twelve (12) months
for reasons other than a substitution
for another
employee
shall,
at the
expiration of the said twelve (12) month
period, be made permanent on the rating
to which s/he was first upgraded within
said period.
If, however, s/he is not
the senior qualified employee on the
rating
from
which
s/he
was
first
upgraded, the senior qualified employee
shall be eligible to be made permanent
on such rating.

Article V:
V.

EXTENDED TRIAL PERIOD:

For the first six months of the assignment as
leader the individual will be subject to
monthly evaluations. At any time during this
six-month period management may elect to have
the
candidate
return
to
their
previous
position
and
rate
of
pay
based
on
unsatisfactory
performance
against
these
evaluation
criteria.
Also, at any time
during this six-month period the candidate
may
elect to
return
to
their
previous
position and rate of pay.

Once the period is over the candidate is
permanent and is subject to the normal rules
of performance and all other provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement
under
established practices.
Section (c):
c.

In

The Company will fill six (6)
Lead
Nuclear
Maintenance
positions
and
will
make
assignments on an as-needed
provided in Article XIX of the
agreement.

accordance

with

Section

(c),

permanent
Mechanic
temporary
basis as
principal

aforesaid,

the

Company

filled six permanent Lead Nuclear Maintenance Mechanics jobs, the
appointments of which and their permanence after the six -month
period set forth in Article V above, are not in dispute in this
proceeding.
The Company also appointed the six grievants in this case to
the "temporary assignments" also referred to in Section (c).
It

is

the

Union's

contention

that

the

entitled to and should have been made permanent
after serving
Article

V,

therein for six months.
providing

for

permanence

grievants

were

in that title

The Union asserts that
after

six

months

is

applicable to both the "permanent" positions and the "temporary"
positions provided in Section (c).
The Company's position is that Article V was intended and
should be interpreted to apply only to the original six permanent
appointed

Lead

Nuclear

Maintenance

Mechanics,

but

that

Article XIX Section 3 of the basic contract remains applicable
and controlling with regard to the "temporary assignments" of the
grievants.
At the first hearing, the Company moved for the denial of
the Union's grievance on the grounds of the parol evidence rule,
asserting that the contract and Memorandum language was clear and
unambiguous and that it could not be changed

or impeached by

other evidence or testimony.
In opposition, with a similar argument on the clarity of the
contract and Memorandum
sustaining

language, the Union moved for a ruling

the greivance.

The parties briefed their respective

motions, after which the Beard met and issued a Ruling denying
both motions.

In pertinent part we stated inter alia:

"The Board rules that it needs more probative
evidence
to
determine
(which)...contract
provisions
are
controlling
and/or
dispositive of this case."
In short, the Board concluded that standing alone, the cited
contract

and memorandum

provisions

were

conflicting

and hence

ambiguous.
The second hearing was responsive to that Ruling.
What has to be decided is simply whether Article V, which
both

sides

agree

changed

Article

XVII

paragraph

13

contract by increasing the qualifying time limit for the

of

the

permanent
months 1 ,
twelve

appointments

to

also changed the
( 1 2 ) months to six

this

position

from

qualifying period

30 days

to

six

in Article XIX from

(6) months for the grievants, assigned

"temporarily."
I conclude that it

did not,

and that the twelve

( 1 2 ) month

period of Article XIX remained applicable to the grievants.
As

the

parties

certainly

ambiguities in contract
arbitrators
language

from

it

is

well

settled

language and provisions are

evidence

usage, past

know,

of

practice

bargaining
and if

resolved by

history,

necessary

that

customary

and f i n a l l y by

application of the burden of proof.
Here
extensive

the

testimony

and

obviously

conflicting,
asserts
period
the

offsetting

that
(i.e.

Company's

in

need for

the

bargaining

strongly

and hence

exchange

six-months

on

for

instead

held

a realistic

each

to

a

side,

supervisory)

Company's

agreement

it

would

job,
be

it

is

to

qualifying
accommodate

evaluation period

(and previously

though

The Union

longer

thirty days)

important

that

by

indeterminative.

agreeing
of

history,

for

this

obtained

applicable

for

the
all

assignments to the position "temporary" as well as "permanent."

1

Article XVII paragraph 13 reads:

" . . . A n y employee assigned to a vacancy shall have thirty (3) days in
which to q u a l i f y .
If, in the opinion of the Company, s/he is unable to
q u a l i f y , s/he may return to the rating from which s/he came without loss of
seniority therein. Should an employee a f t e r accepting a new rating desire to
return to his/her previous rating, and so informs the Company w i t h i n t h i r t y
30) days a f t e r being assigned to the new rating, s/he may r e t u r n to h i s / h e r
former rating when a vacancy occurs without loss of seniority t h e r e i n . . . . "

And that because both types of appointments could be based on the
immediate

skill

bypassing

of

and

strict

employees to claim

ability

needed,

seniority,

the

thereby

rights

of

allowing
bypassed

the job later under Article

the

senior

XIX Section 3

should not be delayed for as long as one year.2
So to prevent or minimize what the Union characterizes as
"cherry picking" for as long as one year, it argues that the time
limit

in Article XIX

Section

3 correspondingly

shortened

the

period for any Lead Nuclear Maintenance Mechanic job.
The

Company's

testimony

denies

any

such

corresponding

arrangement.
It asserts that the parties agreed on an extension of the
qualifying period from thirty (30) days to six (6) months because
opportunities
intensive

for

"permanent"

scrutiny

of

wc"_~k

positions

required

progress

than

"temporarily on an as-needed basis."
were

"slotted

to

be

permanent"

but

closer,

those

more

appointed

In other words the former
the

latter

not.

So a

different qualifying period was needed for the former but not for
the latter.

"
...If however s/he is not the senior qualified employee...the senior
qualified employee shall be eligible to be made permanent...."

The Company points out that Article V is titled Extended
Trial Period, and as such can only extend the shorter period of
Article XVII paragraph 13, but cannot logically be interpreted to
shorten the longer period of Article XIX.
As I have said, I believe that both sides not only hold to
but believe their interpretations of what was bargained.
actual consequence
probably

no

of those divergent views is that there was

precise

and

mutually

minds" on that critical question.
bargaining

But the

history,

though

understood

"meeting

of the

Hence I find the testimony on

logically

supportive

of

both

interpretations, is still ambiguous and indeterminative.
Based

on

the

entire

record,

however,

with

particular

consideration of the specific language of the material contract
and Memorandum sections,

and the evidence

conclude

has not met

that the Union

of past practice, I

its burden

of proof

in

support of its interpretation.
Section

(c)

sets

up

"Permanent" and "Temporary."

two

categories

of

appointments

If it were meant and intended that

both categories would become permanent in six (6) months, I fail
to see the need

to establish two expressly

different groups.

They both would be eligible for permanence in six months.
intent must have been otherwise.

Therefore

So the

I find more logical

and compelling that those appointees "slotted" for "permanence"
be subject to evaluation sooner and more discernibly than those
appointed

on

an

"as

needed" basis.
7

I interpret "as needed"

to mean "periodically," "off and on" and "temporary."

For them

a longer qualifying period is both logical and understandable.
As to the Union's "cherry picking" argument, I fail to see
how

a

six

months

employees

than

permanence

is

senior

a

trial

period

one-year

obtained,

employee

is more

period.

an

protective

In

otherwise

either

bypassed

is entitled to claim the

job.

of

senior

event,
but

when

qualified

Indeed

under

Article XIX Section 3, the protection of such a senior employee
is expressly preserved
(12) months.

for and after a trial period of twelve

By that contract provision

agreed to tolerate

the Union has already

"cherry picking" for a twelve month period.

So, its argument that the twelve months of Article XVII must be
reduced six months by application of Article V to gain protection
for the senior employee

is negated by the existing language of

Article XIX.
Additionally,

it

is

also

well

settled

that

negotiated

language should be given its normal and customary meaning.
the

section

of the Memorandum which

triggers

a change

Here

in the

trial period (i.e. Article V) is entitled "Extended Trial Period"
(emphasis added).

If the parties intended its applicability to

both Article XVII and Article XIX, they should not have limited
it by the word
on both.

"Extended" or they should have stated its effect

So, normal word interpretation compels its relevance to

Article XVII not to Article XIX. And finally, again interpreting
words

and phrases

in a normal and customary manner, Section

(c)

makes

temporary

explicit

the

conditions

principal

will be

made

agreement."

"as provided

for

"as-needed"

XIX,

including

in the absence

in Article

XIX

of the

It does not say Article XIX except the

trial period time limit therein.

Thus,

and

appointees. It states specifically that the temporary

assignments

Article

of

the

Rather it encompasses all of

twelve

(12),

of any probative

month

trial period.

evidence pointing

to a

different interpretation of that conditional language, it must be
interpreted as it is written - namely by application of all of
Article XIX to the grievants in this case.
Finally,

the

Company's version.

evidence

of

past

practice

supports

the

Other appointees on initial "temporary" bases

were not made permanent until after serving twelve

(12) months.

And none have been made permanent in less time.
Based on all the foregoing, and despite what I have stated
is my belief that the Union sincerely believes that it intended
that the grievants and others similarly situated are and should
be eligible for permanent
service,

appointments

after six

(6) months of

it has not met the requisite burden of proof

case.

Eric J/ Schmertz, Chairman

in this

NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
JURISDICTIONS DISPUTES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

I.B.F..W. LOCAL UNION NO. 3
-andLADORERS LOCAL UNION NO. 78

The jurisdictional dispute between the above-named Unions
involves:
"The Drilling of Holes for the
Installation
or' Electrical
Work
Within an Asbestos Containment Area
at the Francis Lewis High School,
Queens, New York."
.
A hearing was held on October 14, 2005 at which

time

representatives of .bolh Unions appeared and were afforded full
opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and

cross-examine witnesses.
The Members of Ihe Arbitration Panel were:
Morris Napolitano

Howard Hirsch
Allan Paul

John Brunetti
. .
and the Undersigned, as Chairman
Certain facts are not disputed, Si- significant part the work
involved the removal of tiles, attached to concrete, and then the
drilling

of holes in the concrete for

electrical equipment'.

the installation of

It is agreed that the tiles (referred to above) contained
asbestos.
These tiles wore removed by the Laborers Local 78.

It is

undisputed that that work was within that Unions jurisdiction,
and is not claimed by Local 3.
Because the General Contractor and'/or the School
Construction

Authority assumed that the concrete contiguous to

the tiles also contained asbestos, it or they assigned the
drilling of holes in the concrete also to the Laborers Local 78.
The evidence

adduced shows that certain members of both

Unions have been trained and possess the required legal licenses
to perform work involving exposure to asbestos.
Local 3 asserts that because the drilling of the holes was
for

the

purpose

of

installing

or

dealing

with

electrical

equipment, and because its members are licensed to work in an
asbestos containment area, that work should have been assigned to
and performed by Local 3 (concedely \under the supervision of a
licensed asbestos supervisor).
Local 78 asserts that, with the undisputed fact that the
tiles

contained

or were of asbestos, it was .proper and

in

accordance with operating practice for the contractor or School
Authority to deem the entire job "asbestos contaminated" and that
therefore all • the work in an a.rea of asbestos

(including

drilling in the concrete) was properly assigned to the trade

the

f i rst assigned to handle that particular type of work, namely in
this case local "78.
Both unions offered testimony, argument and evidence on
other

Jobs'

each

contaminates

handled

in

which

asbestos

and/or . other

were present, so vrhatever practice there has been

appears to be disparate, and conflicting.
The parties were expressly advised at the outset o£ the
hearing that the authority of the Arbitration panel under the New
York Plan is, inter alia and in pertinent part:

'"

l

"The arbitration panel shall be bound by
Green Book decisions,. .or when there are
none, international Agreements of record
between the trades.
If none of these apply
for any reason...the arbitration panel shall
consider the established trade practice and
prevailing practice in the Greater New York
geographical area."
Local 78's case rests primarily on its citation of Green
Book Decision # 100-j which held:
"Drilling of holes for the expressed purpose
of mounting various electrical equipment in
suspected asbestos containing material is the
work of laborers Local 78.
(and this Decision was made 'area-wide' by
subsequent action of its arbitration pane}.}."
Local 3 disputes the validity and applicability of that
Decision.

It points out that at first the loca-1- j urisdictiona

awarded this
Arbitrator

type

of work, to local 3, but

Thomas G, Pagan

that on

appeal,

in September 2002 reversed the

decision

local decision and rendered a National Award, granting the work
to Local. 78.

That decision argues Local 3, wa-s<

erroneous and flawe»H.
The controlling precedent, asserts

Local 3 ,

is

a National

a-rb it ration award dated January 18, 2005 in which Arbitrator Paul
Greenberg, under facts similar to the case before Pagan and to
the instant dispute, awarded the work (in California) to Local 3.
Under our express authority the Panel is unable to credit
the Greenbcrq's decision over that of Decision 100-j in the Green
Book.

The former is not in the Green Book; it is not from the

New York geographical area, nor does it qualify as a National
Agreement (which must be signed by the presidents of the Unions
involved) .
We have previously stated -;hat the evidence of prevailing
practice is unclear' and hence indeterminate.
What remains therefore is the Green Book Decision 100-j.
One o£ the benefits of an arbitration case is that at the
hearing facts are developed that may be more accurate than and
different from what the parties believed at the time the dispute
arose.
That is the case here, . Tha parties agreed at the hearing
that the removal of the asbestos tiles was the work of Local 78.
They also agreed that if there was no asbestos i.n the concrete/

Local 78 would not. claim the drilling work and it would belong
properly to Local 3.
The Panel believes and rules that the actual facts, as
disclosed at the hearing should and therefore will "reform" the
nature

of

this dispute,

and

hence

be

the

basis

for

its

resolution.
The critical fact that emerged 'at the hearing was that
based

on

a

test

by

an

independent

testing

organization

(apparently ordered by the School Authority) the concrete did not
contain asbestos,
Therefore that accepted fact distinguishes this case from
the Application of Decision 100-j.
asbestos "is suspected."

That Decision applies when

And about 25% of the dispute of work in

this case was performed by Local 78 because of that "suspicion."
But now that it is established t.iat there is no present basis to
suspect

asbestos

in

the

pru.spp.c(.iv«!.y ,ippHcablc.

concrete,

Decision

100-j

is

not

And t.:ier«£6rtfthe-balavceof the drilling

may and shall be done by Local 3.
In short, though the Panel is in disagreement over whether the
Pagan decision (and hence Green Book Decision 100-j) was properly
decided

or

wrongly

decided,

we

need

not

consider

either

ovuiruling it .ui enforcing or applying it. We need not, because,
as stated, Lhe dispute is now mooted .by I he new evidence *ridur:ed

.•

at the hearing.

Specifically, to -.reiterate, Lhe removal of the

tiles-which contained asbestos was properly the work of Local 78.
But because the evidence shows thai Lhe concrete docs ' not
contain

asbestos,

the prospective drilling

of holes

in the

:o<ic;rele lor Lhe installation oC electrical equipment was and is
the work of Local 3,

Eric J/Schmert2, Chairman
DATED:

October 24, 200b

STATE OF NEW YORK
--.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

RI-399 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
PANEL

-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
OPINION AND
between
Case #^QQM-1B-503228644
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
P&DC Buffalo, N,Y.

-andOperational Change 121-48
AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO
-andNATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION

-X
Before:

Eric J, Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the U.S. Postal Services
Mr. Anthony Salzo, Jr.
For the APWU:
Mr, Michael E, LaPoint
For the NPMHU:
Mr. David E. Wilkin

Place of Hearing;

Buffalo P&D Facility

Date of Hearing:

September 8, 2004; remanded January 9, 2005

This will complete my Award of November 12r 2004.
In
thereof,

that
to

thirty-day
change.

Award
afford

period

I

referred

them

the

back

to

the

opportunity to

parties

issue

#2

negotiate

for

the

required under RI399 prior to an

operational

The parties have now advised me (by letter dated January 9,
2005} that their effort to negotiate a resolution has failed and
pursuant to my retained jurisdiction, have remanded that issue to
me for determination.
Issue #2 reads:
Did the Postal Service violate RI399 by
assigning clerk's to manual .operation 121^48?
If so, what shall be the remedy, except
monetary?
Based on the record before me from the hearing of September
8,

2004,

and

particularly

my

authorized

observation

(with

representatives of the parties) of the operation in dispute, along
with other "similar'"' methods of operation, I conclude

that the

disputed manual operation is properly manned by clerks and not in
violation of RI399.
I find that the

xvbull

pen" method used to carry out the work

is one aspect of a more comprehensive

operation that is and has

been manned by both clerks and mail handlers, and hence is and has
been a "mixed" jufisdictional operation.

It is well

settled,

generally, that where a work jurisdiction is ^mixed" or engaged in
by more than one craft or classification, separate aspects of the
work, either new or different

(but still part of the overall

function) may be assigned to either or any of the crafts or unions
with joint or multiple jurisdictions.

{This does not mean that

either craft that is working can be displaced by the other in an

misting

operation.

That

would

prejudice

the

existing

mix

jurisdiction).
But that is informational dicta and not necessarily the basis
for this decision.
Rather/
precedent.

I decide this issue on the basis

of practice and

My observation of the operation and other "bull pen"

methods persuades me that the manual operation of 121-48, manned
only be clerks is substantively the same and a replication
other previously and presently

existing

of

"bull pen" operations,

performing the same type of work and manned exclusively by clerks.
I recognize that those prior existing manual operations are
no longer challengeably by the mail handlers/ because of the "cut
off" date set forth in RI399.

But that does not mean that they do

not establish a practice and precedent applicable to the instant
issue #2,

The fact is that after the establishment of those prior

operations,, and .before the "cutoff date," the mail handlers did
not challenge their establishment.

So the practice and hence the

precedent obtained then, and are not now vitiated or nullified by
the RI399 cutoff date.

In short, the cutoff date in RI399, after

which this type .of operation was unchallengeable, applies, not
just to those pre-existing "bull pen operations," but by practice
and

precedent

to

the

instant

dispute,

rendering

it

also

Unchallengeable.
I caution, however, that this ruling is limited to the facts
and circumstances of this case and this record, and
3

is not a

license for subsequent changed operations on which the facts and
circumstances may be different and hence disputable.

AWARD

Based
on
the
particular
facts
and
circumstances
in this case, the
Postal
Service did not violate RI399 by assigning
clerks to manual operation 121-48.

DATED:

February 3, 2005
Eric^J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
COUNTY OF. NEW YORK

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

RI-399 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
ARBITRATION PANEL
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Case#AOOM-lA-J04116249

-andAMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO

AWARD AND OPINION

-andNATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION
-X

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the U.S. Postal Services
James J. Kirk
For the APWU:
Michael E. LaPoint
For the NPMHU:
Lawrence Hill

Place of Hearing:

MidHudson P&DC, Newburg, New York

Dates of Hearing:

September 21; October 20, 2004

AWARD

The Service and the Mail Handlers agreed on the following
stipulated issue:
Did Management violate the principles of
RI399 by continuing the assignment of clerks
to the Outgoing Primary on the Low Cost Tray
Sorter?
If so what shall be the remedy?
(i.e. who gets the assignment?)
The Postal Workers stated the issue as:
Whether the assignment of clerks to the Low
Cost Tray Sorter (LCTS) at the Newburgh
Postal Facility was proper or not?
Frankly,
consequence

I do not
as

to

see this case of such

be

controlled

by

the

jurisdictional

many

arbitration

decisions or agreements, both regional and national cited by the
parties, or the bulk of their arguments thereon.
decision
Rather,

in

this

I find

case

af precedential

that the

for

facts in this

Nor do I see a

any

case

other matter.
as

sufficiently

unique to confine the decision to those unique facts.
Based

on the

record

before me

I see this matter

as a

temporary, ad hoc use of clerks, for a few hours each day, on a
particular
purpose
airports.

tour,

was

to

for a particular
perform

Act

Tag

purpose.
work

on

That
outgoing

particular
mail

to

And clerks were so assigned to relieve a large volume

of work during the time involved.

The overwhelming balance of

the

work

on

the

Outgoing

Primary

Low

Cost

Tray

Sorter

was

officially and jurisdictionally assigned to the Mail Handlers.
To my mind the stipulated issue agreed to by the Service
contains a significant word.

That word is "continuing."

To me

that means that the placing of clerks on the Act Tag work (in
limited numbers, for limited time on one tour) was for a special
purpose, and confined to that purpose.

It may well have been

consistent with general jurisdictional agreements and decisions
that clerks could properly perform work related to sending mail
to airports for air delivery.

But I am not persuaded that the

Service so assigned clerks in this case because of that claimed
general jurisdiction

or authority.

Rather, I conclude that it

did so, again temporarily and ad hoc, to handle the extra volume
and because Act Tag work (exclusive of other methods of handling
mail destined to airports) had been properly assigned to clerks
in the past.
limited

to

In other words, I find that this dispute is solely
the

ad

hoc,

temporary

placing

of

clerks on that

particular phase of the Primary Low Cost Tray Sorter operation.
(Indeed it is not disputed that the clerks were not permanently
so assigned).

As such, when that particular function ended (the

record is unclear whether it was ended in 2001 or as late as
2003) the reason and condition for which the Service assigned
clerks, also expired.

The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as

the

Arbitrator

and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following Award:
On the basis of the foregoing opinion, Management
improperly continued the assignment of clerks to
the outgoing Primary Low Cost Tray Sorter.
The
work
presently
involved
falls
within
the
jurisdiction of the Mail Handlers.

Eric
DATED:

.Schmertz,Arbitrator

January 10, 2005

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Eric J/T Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DISPUTE ARBITRATION PANEL
-x
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION

-aridA98M-lA-J00245921-Odl95
AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION

-arid-

CLASS ACTION

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
-X
Before Eric .J. Schmertz, Arbitrator:
Appearances;

For the NPMHU;
Mr. Lawrence Hill
For the A:PWU;
Mr. Michael E, LaPdiht
For the U.S. Postal SirvicSs

Mr, Carmine V. Palladino
Place of Hearing:

Mid Island p'&b'cV Melville -, New York

Dates of Hearing;

October 27, 2004; December 29, 2004

In

dispute

portion of

arid

objected

an assignment

to by

the Mail Handlers

letter of August

11, 2000

is that

from H.W.

sJphnspn, Manager in Plant Support which inter alia reads:
Prep

incident

to

other

operations at

SPBS :
Sweeper either
guidelines . "

craft

as

per

current

SPSS

The Mail Handlers content that that agsignment reference is
in error because the work involved, namely the untying of bundled
flats and placing each flat piece in an ergo cart, is work that is
and has been exclusively assigned to Mail Handlers,

And that to

now identify it as work for "either craft" would improperly open
the door to cross assignments of clerks (i.e. Postal Workers)' to
that function.
I conclude that the Services assignment letter of October 11 /
2000

is in error, but not precisely

Handlers.

as contended by the Mail

The assignment letter, in my judgment, which affirms a

mixed jurisdictions! assignment, should apply to the overall SPBS
operation.

The record before me shows that both Mail Handlers and

clerks work on various phases or duties of the SPBS operation, and
in that respect that overall operation is undertaken on a mixed
juris.dictipnal ijasis.

The work in dispute is a .simple process or

aspect ef- the overall operation.

It is merely a segment thereof,

at which employees remove the bundling of flat mail arid place each

individual

piSci

in

an

irgo

cart

for

further

sorting

and

distribution .-

I fail to see why one aspect of a fully identified operation,
should

be

separately

and

uniquely

subject

to

its

own

jtirisdictionai assignment decision, when the overall operation is
already undisputed as of mixed jurisdiction.

For by doing so, it

is urid©'rstahdabl§ if the" craft thlt is Ihd has been
. \

*-. -v

.

-

^

••: -^

. ,

-.

,

,

performing

.

. i

-

that small segment of overall operation; interprets it as a method
of replacing

Mail Handlers with clerks.

The fact is that the

October 11th,- 2000 assignment notwithstanding, clerks have not been
regularly assigned to the disputed work and there appears to be no
plan to do 39,
justiciable

Nonetheless, though the dispute may not yet be

(because

no Mail

Handlers

have

been

displaced

by

clerks) , the parties hgive asked for a ruling in the abbve=referred
position of the October 11th, 2000 letter .To do so, I think relevant is what I wrote in case JOOM-1B503228644 (Buffalo P&D Facility) dated February 3, 2005.
I said:
"It is well settled, generally; that where a
work jurisdiction is mixed or engaged in by
more
than
one
craft
or classification,
separate aspects of the work; either new or
di-f-£e-£en_t. (but s^till part of the overall
function) may be assigned to either or any of
the crafts or Unions with joint or multiple
jurisdiction's." (emphasis added)

Therein

But I went oh to say:
"This doe$ not mean that either craft that is
working can b'e displaced By the other in an
existing operation;. That would prejudice the
existing
jurisdictional
mix.
(emphasis
added)
Here,

the

disputed work

is

an

has

been

exclusive assignment by the Mail ;Handlers.
ph|se of the SPSS operation;

I would

disputed

work;

not

an

That phase is not a new or different

sustain the

causing

as

They are working that

methodology but rather an existing process.
rulings,

performed

Based on the above

assignment

displacement

of

Mail

of

clerks

to

the

Handlers

or

the

deprivation of existing work they have been performing.
As this case is in the nature of a declaratory judgment, I am
prepared now to also rule that where an operation is worked on a
jurisdictignally mixed basis,

the percentages Of the Crafts or

Union so assigned should be reasonably maintained.
if

the

mixed

assignments

are

roughly

equal,

So for example
that

equal

representation should be maintained, and that is why one craft or
Union should not be permitted to replace or displace the other
craft or Union.

To permit otherwise would allow the Service in

mixed jurisdictional cases, to nullify or dilute the mixture, by
wholesale replacement of one classification or Union by the other,
.T-hat ,would be to do by indirection what the assignment procedures
do riot permit directly.

AWARD

For the foregoing reasons; the Services letter of
October 11, 2000 may properly identify the SPBS
operation as mixed jurisdictional work for both the
Mail Handlers and the clerks; Because the language
objected to by the' Mail Handlers could be
interpreted as allowing the Service to displace
Mail Handlers with clerks on the existing process
of separating flats arid placing them into ergo
cartst that reference (i;e; "mail prep incident to
other operations at SPBS sweeper either craft...")
shall be deleted.

DATED:

MareH 9, 2005

ErijXJ. Schmertz:
Apfeitrator
STATE OF NEW YORK
SSI

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J; Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in arid who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

1

RI399 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
ARBITRATION PANEL
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
CASE #B98M-1A-JO222 1934
MELVILLE, NEW YORK

-andAMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION
-andNATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS
UNION

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearance:

For the U.S. Postal Service
Mr. Jeffrey Smith
For the APWU
Mr. Michael E. LaPoint
For the NPMHU
Mr. Lawrence Hill

Place of Hearings:

Melville, N. Y.

Date of Hearings

May 2 and 3, 2006

Date of Award:

June 23, 2006

OPINION AND AWARD

This jurisdictional dispute is over the classification of "Gate Keeper."
That job, physically located adjacent to the Manual Distribution area, has as its
primary function to examine undeliverable mail and direct that mail to an appropriate
machine (if deliverable) or, if undeliverable return it to the sender. I conclude that that
work is "distribution" of the mail, and historically, contemporaneously and substantively allied and nexus to the undisputed jurisdiction of the Clerk title.
More specifically, the Gate Keeper looks at mail that is irregular or in some
respects defective and hence initially undeliverable, and because of those defects,
could not be processed normally to and through the various automated equipment
The Gate Keeper determines what is to be done with that mail. Among the decisional
possibilities are returning or sending the mail to a processing machine; manually
distributing the mail by the process of placing each item physically in pigeon
compartments in the Manual Distribution locations; or returning the item to the sender.
The defects that the Gate Keeper deals with include wrong addresses, wrong or inadequate postage, wrong or missing zip codes, unmanageable size (i.e. too large
for the Flat Sorter).
But for those defects the mail would have been routinely handled by Clerks who

-2-

undisputedly are properly assigned to the various automated equipment.1
Significant to my mind is that this work by the Gate Keeper is substantively the
same and with the same procedurally objective as the work of the Clerks manning the
various automated machines. The end result sought is to correct the irregular
defectively submitted mail, conforming it to the regular processes, and, like the regular
mail, prepare it for the same distribution methods and results.
Indeed, additionally significant is that some of that mail has to be manually
distributed by Clerks, who physically read the addresses, and place each item into a
segregated (by destination) pigeon compartment on a shelf in the Manual Distribution
area; that the Gate Keeper, and his work area logically for that purpose, is located
adjacent to the Manual Distribution area, and that apparently at times the Clerks interchange between the Gate Keeper job and the Manual Distribution process.
I judge that but for modern automation, distribution of the mail would (and I
believe did) be handled manually, by Clerks, reading addresses, and physically
placing each item in a bin, pigeonhole or other receptacle appropriately labeled for

1. Optical Character Reader (OCR); Delivery Bar Code Sorters; Bar Code Sorters, "Chunky" Sorters;
Flat Sorters; and Return to Sender.

1

-3-

distribution designation.
Therefore, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that the automated machines
are nothing more than the modern substitute for the manual handling and distribution
by Clerks. And it is therefore logical that those machines be manned, as they
undisputedly are, by Clerks, who previously did or would have done the work
That then is the obvious nexus between the work of the Gate Keeper and the
jurisdiction of the Clerks. Hence, I deem it substantively and operationally defensible,
and jurisdictionally proper for the job of Gate Keeper to be in the primary jurisdiction of
the Postal Workers (i.e. Clerks).
Lest this be considered solely my subjective view, I call attention to RI399 and
Mail Processing Work Assignment Guidelines Qoint Exhibit #1 in the record) which
explicitly provides under the heading Primary Guidelines for multiple cited
operations that the Clerk classification is the primary craft for
"identifying and reporting as appropriate,
mail not meeting postal regulations."
What the Gate Keeper does meets that jurisdictional definition.
This finding in no way is in derogation of the rights of the Mail Handlers.
Adjacent to the Gate Keeper, it is undisputed that the collection and transporting of the
irregular mail from various locations in the facility to the Gate Keeper is the work of and

-4-

within the jurisdiction of the Mail Handlers. And similarly, the transporting of that mail
to the locations and/or machines designated by the Gate Keeper is the work and within
the jurisdiction of the Mail Handlers.
One final observation, albeit gratuitous. This case is unique (at least to me) because the Service does not take a position favorable to either the Clerks or the Mail
Handlers. Apparently, operationally, though the Clerks have been granted the primary
jurisdiction, (and as distinguished from "joint jurisdiction"), at times on or during certain
shifts, Mail Handlers have been assigned, or filled in, or helped out with the duties of
the Gate Keeper, on an ad hoc basis. Presumably, the Service has found this practice
operationally useful, particularly with the ebb and flow of the required work. And the
Service has asked, both at the hearing and in its brief, that this "status quo" be
maintained.
I do not have the authority to so rule (unless I found "joint jurisdiction," which I do not).
My authority and duty under RI399 is to decide which Union has jurisdiction, when,
as here, exclusive jurisdiction is determinable.
My gratuitous observation is just this. With this decision in favor of the Clerks,
and with jurisdiction so officially determined, both Unions may well wish to consider
the Service's position and possibly agree on a "non-prejudicial" and non-binding
basis, to maintain the "status quo" operationally. By doing so, though the Clerks are
granted the jurisdiction over the Gate Keeper job, members of both Unions would

-5-

continue to enjoy some work in that job title, presuming that no layoffs are involved).
Of course this gratuitous observation (or recommendation) is only that and is for the
consideration of the parties hereto exclusively and in no way alters my Award.2

AWARD

The classification of Gate Keeper is within the jurisdiction of the Postal Worker
(i.e. Clerks).

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the
individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.
STATE OF

NEW YORK)

COUNTY OF

NEW YORK) ss:

DATE:

JUNE 23, 2006

In this regard, of course the National Labor Relations Act and the decision of the National Labor Relations
Board are not applicable here. But on an advisory basis they may be instructional and of interest.
In jurisdictional disputes under that Act, among the standards and evidence that the Board considers
relevant and to which it "gives great weight" in reaching a decision, is "the employers preference" (NLRB
v. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 50 504F.2nd 1209).

2

NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT. ASSOCIATION
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (PBA)
-and-

PERB CASE NOS.
1A2004-008
M-2004-024

THE CITY OF NEW YORK (CITY)

The Undersigned, duly designated as a Public Arbitration Panel under Article TV,
Section 209 of the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (The Taylor Law), and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, and having
duly considered said proofs and allegations under the standards of said Law, namely
paragraph (v), subparagraphs a, b, c and d, make the following AWARD:
1.

By operation of law, the jurisdiction of this Panel is to
determine the conditions of employment for the period
August 1, 2002 through July 31, 2004. .Also by
operation of law, those determined conditions of
employment continue in effect for the subsequent
"status quo" period, namely in this case, from August 1,
2004 until a successor contract is negotiated or
otherwise determined.

:

2.

Therefore, the term of the contract before this Panel,
and between the above-named parties is August 1, 2002
through July 31,2004.

3.

For the aforesaid periods of time there shall be two
across the board, retroactive wage increases. The base
annual salary rates of all bargaining unit employees
shall be increased by 5% effective August 1, 2002 and
further increased by 5% (compounded) effective
August 1, 2003, except as provided in paragraph 4(c)
for newly hired employees referred to therein.

4.

For the aforesaid periods of time, effective July 31,
2004, but to be implemented after the date of this
Award, the following changes shall be made in
conditions of employment:
(a)

For increased productivity the one day a year
personal leave day is eliminated, but this will
not take away any personal leave days accrued
as of June 30, 2004;

(b)

For

increased

productivity

the

present

contractual right of the Department under
Article JU, Section l(b) of the 1995-2000
collective bargaining agreement as modified by
2

the Award of the Public Arbitration Panel dated
September 4, 2002 (the "Collective Bargaining
Agreement") to reschedule up to 10 tours, shall
be increased to up to 15 tours;
(c)

For internal savings, employees newly hired
after the date of this Award shall be paid in
accordance with the following schedule of base
annual salary rates:

Police Academy (First Six Months of Employment) at

$25,100 (Annualized)

Upon Completion of Six Months of Employment

$32,700

Upon Completion of 1 1/2 Years of Employment

$34,000

Upon Completion of 2 1/2 Years of Employment

$3 8,000

Upon Completion of 3 1/2 Years of Employment

$41,500

Upon Completion of 4 1/2 Years of Employment

$44,100

Upon Completion of 5 1/2 Years of Employment
and thereafter

$59,588

5.

All other terms and conditions of employment as set
forth in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, except as
modified by this Award, shall continue in full force and
effect for the contract period August 1, 2002 through
July 31, 2004 and during the subsequent (and present)
"status quo" period.
3
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Eric J. ScKmertz, Chairman
DATED: June ,2005
STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss: .

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman that I am
the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Carole O'Blenes, Member
Concurring in the Award, including #1 ,
2, 3, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and 5
'
.r*

DATED: Juna^/2005
STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Carole O'Blenes do hereby affirm upon my Oath that I am the individual described in
and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

^L

' Jay W/W/a^s, Member
Concucpmg in the Award, including #1,
2,3,4(a),4(b),4(c)and5
DATED: June#?2005
STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Jay W.
who exe<

do hereby affirm upon my Oath that I am the individual described in and
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

JEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
1LATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE. ARBITRATION,
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
—and—
THE CITY OF NEW YORK

BEFORE

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
Jay' W. Waks,. Member
Carole O'Blenes, Member
APPEARANCES

For the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association:
Ka-ye Scholar LL-P
By: Peter M. Fishbein, Esq.
Barry Wiliner, Esq.
Rachel 1ST. Yarkon, Esq.
For the City of New York:
Proskauer Rose LLP
By: M. David Zurndorfer, Esq.
Neil H. Abramson, Esq.
Also:
Patrick Lynch, President, PBA
James M, Hanley, Commissioner of Labor
Relations,. City of New York
Pamela. S... Sllverblatt,. Deputy Commissioner
of Labor Relations
Michael T, Murray, Esq., PBA General Counsel
Deborah Gaines, Esq., Counsel, Office of
Labor Relations

In accordance with Section 209 of the Civil Service Law,
Article

IV, Public Employees Fair Employment Act

(the Taylor

Law) I was selected by the Patrolmen's Benevolent
(PBA)

and the City Of New York

(City)

Association

and appointed

by

the

Public Employment^ el art ions Board" (PERB) as the Chairman of a
tripartite public arbitration panel, together with the panel
appointees of the PBA and the City, to decide the terms and
conditions of a collective bargaining agreement between them to
succeed
2002.

the predecessor contract
Carole O'Blenes, Esq.

which

expired

on

July

31,

and Jay W. Waks, Esq. served as

the appointees to the panel respectively by 'the City and the
PBA.
As
O'Blenes

contemplated by the Taylor .Law and as expected, Ms.
and

Mr.

Waks,

though

thoroughly

collegial

and

professional and of important technical assistance to me, were
ardent supporters and at times active advocates .on behalf

of

the positions of the party which appointed them.
Hence,

this

Opinion

and

conclusions are mine alone.

its

findings

of

fact

and

As is the Award which, however,

for validity, must be concurred in by at least one of them.
In

sum, the

hearing briefs,

arbitration proceedings

a pre-hearing

conference

consisted

of

pre-

to set guidelines,

fourteen transcribed hearings, several hearings or meetings on
issues of discovery, over 300 voluminous exhibits, twenty-eight
witnesses

(including

many

of

professional

and

scholarly

distinction; the Mayor; members of the City Council; a

former

Controller

Budget

of

the

State

of

New

York;

Director; a former Budget Director;

the

City's

the President of the PBA

and the City's Commissioner of Labor Relations); post-hearing
briefs and .reply briefs as well as extensive correspondence and
communications throughout.

Overwhelmingly

all of that focused

on the issue of wages.
As authorized by the parties following, the completion of
the hearings

and the submission of briefs,

I engaged in an

extensive mediation effort that proved unavailing. My arbitral
authority was expressly preserved in the event that mediation
failed.

Thereafter,

preceding this

Opinion

and Award, the

Panel met and deliberated in executive sessions.
The arbitration case was tried, with extraordinary skill by
.ounsel

for

the

two

national prestigious

law

firms,

Kaye,

Scholar LLP and Proskauer Rose LLP, representing respectively
the.PBA and the City.
All

concerned

evidence
witnesses.

and

were

argument.

afforded

full

opportunity

and. to. examine

and

to

offer

cross-examine

Over

the

almost

fifty

in

labor

management

arbitrator

years

I

have

disputes

practiced
and

as

as
a

an

labo

relations practitioner in which I have heard and decided some
10,000 grievance cases and dozens of interest cases in New York
ity, Boston,. Chicago, New Haven, and Philadelphia, none have
been as comprehensive, as detailed and as well tried as this
instant matter.
However,

notwithstanding

the foregoing, and despite the

rofessional excellence of the case presentations,

a specific

revision in the Taylor Law produces a result that in my view
is

an

Panel's

illogical

and

counterproductive

restriction

on

the

jurisdiction.

That

"restriction" is the

statutory provision

that the

Panel's award may not exceed in time and effectiveness a period
no

greater

agreement.

than

two

years

beyond

the

end

of

the

prior

Section 209 (vi) reads:
"The determination of the public arbitration
panel shall be final and binding upon the
parties for the period prescribed . by the
Panel.
But in no event shall such period
exceed two years- -from- the- t-erminatio-n date
of
any
previous
collective
bargaining
agreement." (emphasis added)

Or

in

this

case .the

Panel's

authority

to

determine

conditions of employment may be only for the period August 1,

2002 through July 31, 2004, a period of time that has obviously
expired.

(The last date of the predecessor contract was July

31, 2002).
In the previous

arbitration before

a Panel

chaired

by

Arbitrator Dana Eischen, the first under the Taylor Law between
these parties, an unsuccessful

effort was made to get mutual

agreement from the parties for an extension of the
term-beyond the two years.

The same unwillingness

agree on an extension of the contract
well.
in

existed

contract

to mutually

this

time

as

However, I made no particular effort to get an extension

this

case

because my

reading

of

the

Statute,

and

more

importantly as expressly confirmed by an authoritatively sought
opinion from PERB, the two-year limitation is mandatory and may
not be extended even by the parties involved.
that

the words "in no event" mean just that

PERB informed me
- namely,

that

under no circumstance, apparently as a matter of public policy,
may the two-year limitation be extended, unless the period in
excess of two years is expressly approved by the Legislature.
Foc-us-ed on this case
flaw

that

that

restrains me

and the Panel

omprehensive consideration
the

parties,

what

limitation

their

highlights a statutory
from

of the issues
present

a realistic

in dispute

relationship

and

between
is,

and

particularly

what

that

relationship

should

be

prospectively

beyond 2004.
By

p

deciding

the terms

of the

contract

for the

expired

eriod 2002 to 2004 the parties, with their present adversial,

indeed

regrettably

confrontational

relationship,

are

thrust

back into virtual immediate bargaining and in all probability
into another interest arbitration for a contract for the period
August

1,

2004

limitations.

forward,
No

time

at

great

is

given

expense
them

and
to

with

similar

reassess

their

positions, make cooperative adjustments, including productivity
gains and internal savings, to seek mutual resolution of their
disputes

and improvement of their relationship

away

from the

immediate pressures of resumed bargaining.
This is not to say that there should be no limitation on
the term of the contract that the arbitrator can fashion but
rather, the full responsibility of the arbitrator should be to
make the parties, and their contract at least chronologically
.urrent.
Also if I accepted the PBA's basic case that the wages of
the men and women of the police bargaining unit are

glaringly

less than those of the police of other jurisdictions, it would
e fiscally irresponsible of me to accommodate that claim, by a

large increase in wages over such a short period as two years.
Rather,

in

that

circumstance,

incremental over a longer period.
basic

case

that

pattern

the

increases

should

be

And if I accepted the City's

bargaining

is

applicable

to

this

matter, the two-year limitation on a period of time that has
passed raises questionably I believe, how a three-year contract
can be

tailored to that two-year limitation and whether it

meets the statutory standards.
The

flaw

is

implementation.

further

compounded

The last contract

by

its

dysfunctional

expired on July 31, 2002.

Almost three years have elapsed during which the parties have
not negotiated a new contract and during which the "status quo"
has obtained.

With no change in conditions of employment the

consequences of this delay are counterproductive.

Any back pay

[award will

a

be

a lump

sum liability of

almost

three-year

agnitude which may not only disturb the City's budget but may
not be understood by taxpayers because of its cash quantity.
Also

the nearly three-year

status quo, without

a review of

their wages, works understandably to depress morale among the
olice ranks.

And

a lessening of morale is hardly

ublic interest.

in the

..

Moreover the lapse of time between the end of the last
(contract

and

the

fact

that four of the last five rounds of
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bargaining between these parties went to terminal

arbitration

suggests,

collective

ominously,

of

the

bargaining under the Statute.

failure

of

direct

It is. not my intention nor do I

have an interest in affixing blame, but one wonders
good

faith

bargaining

by both

sides

took place

whether

or whether

either or both held to their positions to impasse and engaged
in delays,

awaiting and relying on the arbitration

sustain them.
contemplated

forum to

Indeed that kind of "forum shopping"

by the Taylor Law when enacted.

was not

Originally the

Act did not include terminal arbitration for police and fire.
The reason, possibly evidenced by what has happened here, is
that it was thought that it would chill direct bargaining.
The Taylor Law should discourage both the.delays and forum
shopping.

It

completed within
And

for

should
a time

failure to

do

require

good

faith

bargaining

fixed after a contract
so,

either

by

delays

has
or

to

be

expired.

bargaining

failures, it should then mandate, the terminal step - which in
order to encourage direct bargaining could be on a "last best
offer" basis..
Finally though I accept the responsibility,

the Taylor Law

empowers the chairman as the sole impartial judge to determine
expenditures

of what may well be millions of taxpayer dollars
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though he is non-elected and non-accountable.

The tripartite

nature of the Panel which requires concurrence in an award by
at

least

one

of

the 'other members

further complicates the

process by the possibility of substantive compromises in order
to produce that result.

Though the arbitrators under the New

York City Collective Bargaining Law

(which previously applied

prior to the last arbitration) are also non-elected and nonaccountable,

those panels

members

can. share

who

an

are

comprised of

analysis

of .the

three impartial
evidence

with a

collective but impartial wisdom and experience and without the
burden of the two-year rule or the potential need to compromise
with partisan panel members.

..

For all of the foregoing reasons I will render a binding
award concurred in by at least one member of the Panel for the
prescribed contract period August 1, 2002 through July 31, 2004
because I am mandated by law. to do so.
consideration

of

the

parties,

ecommendation for continued

I

But additionally, for

shall

negotiations

make

a

non-binding

toward a

four-year

contract that is not constrained by the impediments of. the twoyear rule.
Before I deal about the facts of this case I feel the need
o make some observations, some of which are not particularly
flattering.

I am distressed at the apparent confrontational

9

relationship

between

these

parties.

Bluntly

it

is

too

antagonistic, too angry and too reciprocally suspicious.

As

the parties no doubt engaged in due diligence in deciding on my
appointment they saw in my writings and my policy statements my
repeated

but

respectful

advice .to

four

Mayors

and

several

leaders of the police and fire unions that they should not be
in

chronic

dispute.

It is

simply

contrary

to

the

public

interest.
Both the Mayor and his administration
members are public servants.

and the-PBA and its

They all have the same fiduciary

duty to the public - to .prevent and fight crime, to maintain
civil order and now to prevent and respond first to acts of
terrorism.

A

longer term

contract which

permits

time

and

methodologies to improve their mutual relationship on a day to
day basis - not just in contract negotiations or

arbitration

would be a fundamental step toward that achievement.
There was not always such adversarialness.

In the 1970's

during the City's extreme fiscal crisis we saw an uncommon and
unusual collaborative and partnership relationship between the
ity and its major unions of municipal employees 4

Granted it

was formed out of a mutual fear of bankruptcy it nonetheless
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served

a

Constructive

purpose

and

provided

a

lesson

and

commendable model that unfortunately did not last.
The collaborative effort to avoid bankruptcy and preserve
the bargaining contracts took several forms.

The unions bought

large

which

quantities

otherwise

of

City

unmarketable.

indefinitely

municipal
The unions

bonds

deferred wage

were

then

increases

until the City's economy revived and was back in

the public bond market.

The City and the unions negotiated on

a continuing basis, at the bargaining table and away from the
bargaining table, to do more of the essential work with less
personnel

and less resources to support both the budget and

wage increases.

That effort was successfully

facilitated

the presence and activity of impartial chairmen appointed by
the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining.

Away from

the

Department

pressures

of

the

bargaining

table

in

Fire

negotiations, where I served, we were able to establish such
innovative

cost

savings

methods . as

adaptive

response,

company interchanges, flexible manning, and slippery water.

fire
In

sa-ni-ta-ti-o-n the late Walter - E-i-s-enberg worked with the City ana
the

Sanitationmen's

methodology,

Union

establishing

the

gain

reduced personnel on trucks and changes

garbage collection systems.
ork

in

increasing

sharing
in the

The late Eva Robbins- did similar

productivity among the omnibus local union
11

of District Council 37.

The unions and the City worked in

tandem with the City's financial community, with the Municipal
Assistance Corporation and the state government in reviving the
City's

economy.

mediators

and

This

activity

impartial

with

chairmen

would

the

should

permit

help

be

of

renewed

consideration

and

a

such

a

longer-term

contract

structure.

I see that too as in the "interest and welfare of

the public" within the meaning of subparagraph

of

skilled

(b) of Section

209 of the Taylor Law.
There are certain observations about the men and women who
serve in the Police Department

that are relevant.

and women are characterized as the "Finest."
that

that is a fact and not

Those men

It is my view

a public relations ploy.

The

fabric of a civil, orderly society based on law, is supported
py

the

police

responsible

for

of

that

society.

preventing

protecting property

Each

crime,

police

apprehending

and life, preparing

officer

is

criminals,

for, preventing

and

responding to acts of terror (with the City on a higher state
of alert

than elsewhere in the country since the . tragedy

9/11), and maintaining sensitivity
political

diversification

to the ethnic, racial and

of its citizenry
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of

so that civil and

olitical

rights

are

protected

within

the

parameters

of

orderliness.
Yes, there have been some highly visible incidents of poor
judgment, use of excessive

force and even brutality by

police officers, but I am convinced

that these

some

are not only

isolated incidents but aberrant, and not representative of the
diligent work by police officers carried out hour by hour and
day by day.

And they do so prepared to put their lives on the

line.
While

reduction

in crime

in the City may

be

a

social

henomenon the work of the "cop on the beat" certainly must be
.redited

as

currently

contributing

to

that

trend.

Especially

when

about 2,400 less police officers are available for

regular patrol and response duties.

I conclude therefore that

police officers are carrying out their multi-faceted

jobs well

and effectively and are therefore productive at a good level.1
Credit is to be given also to the Police Commissioner and
his

staff.

(gained

Commissioner

admiration

Ray Kelly,

for when

we

both

(whom
served

I first met
in

the

and

Dinkin

administration) is a man of extraordinary competence, a

13
On the matter of departmental productivity I deem it immaterial whether the reduction
Jin the compliment of regular police officers was due to a planned budgetary program or results
rom recruitment difficulties.

profound knowledge of policing policy and tactics, with uncommon
leadership qualities."
suited

for

relationship

a

He and his administration are uniquely

new,

innovative

and

mutually

beneficial

between the Department and the PBA and a longer

ontract term which grants the opportunity for that development
can make that result more probable.
In 1968 a panel headed by former United States
ourt

Justice Arthur

Lindsay

to

negotiations
Fighters

make

J.

findings

between

and

and

appointed

the

the

PBA,

when

Mayor
in

contract

Uniformed

was

appointed

as

Chairman

Fire

Sanitationmen1s

stated that New York City Police Officers

I

John

the Uniformed

be 'among the highest paid in the nation."
knew

by

recommendations

the City,

Association,

Association,

Goldberg,

Supreme

should

As the parties
of

the

instant

arbitration Panel, I was a member of the Goldberg panel and
indeed wrote its report.2
It should not surprise the parties hereto that ray view
then are my views today.

But the instant arbitration case i

not to be decided on personal opinions or ideology but rathei
on the application of the controlling

law - the Taylor

Law

the following will show I have concluded that the standard
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The Goldberg panel, in addition to Justice Goldberg, consisted of Vincent McDonnell,
falter Eisenberg, the Reverend Philip Carey, and myself.

of the Taylor Law compel wage increases for the New York City
police

officers

that

should

and will move

them

toward

the

Goldberg panel objective.
On the merits of the present case my authority and that of
the Panel is explicitly prescribed in the standards set forth
in the Taylor Law in determining wages (the overriding issue in
this case.)

The Taylor Law requires that:

(v) the arbitration panel shall make a just
and reasonable determination of the matters
in
dispute.
In
arriving
at
such
determination, the Panel shall specify the
basis
for
its
findings/
taking
into
consideration, in addition to any other
relevant factors, the following:
a. comparison of the wages, hours and
conditions
of
employment
of
the
employees involved in the arbitration
proceeding with the wages, hours, and
conditions of the employment of other
employees performing similar services
or
requiring
similar
skills
under
similar working conditions and with
other employees generally in public and
private
employment
in
comparable
communities;
b.
the interests and welfare of the
public and the financial ability of the
public employer to-pay;
c. comparison of peculiarities in
regard to other trades or professions,
including specifically, (1) hazards of
employment; (2) physical qualifications; (3) educational qualifications;
(4) mental qualifications; (5) job
training and skills;
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d,
the terms of collective agreements
negotiated between the parties in the
past providing for compensation and
fringe benefits, including, but not
limited to., the. provisions, for salary,,
insurance
and
retirement
benefits,
medical and hospitalization benefits,
paid time off and job security.
I shall refer to the•standards set forth in a, b, c and d
above

respectively

as

"comparisons/'

"public

welfare

and

interest and ability to pay,"' ""peculiarities" and 'bargaining
history/'

COMPARISONS
Comparisons must begin with a comparison o.f the provisions
of the New York, City Collective Bargaining Law (which obtained
earlier) and the Taylor Law which now applies.

The former

provides comparisons- of "characteristics of employment o-f other
employees performing similar work and other employees generally
in public and private employment in New York City or comparable
ommun-ities"

(emphasis

supplied).

The

latter calls

for

a

comparison with "'other employees performing similar services or
requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and
with other employees generally in public and private employment
in comparable communities."'
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As the parties know I was an impartial member of both the New
York City Board of Collective Bargaining and the State Public
Employment

Relations

Board

and

administered

This is not the forum to determine

both

"substantial

statutes.

equivalency"

but it appears to me that in this particular case there is a
difference.

Under the New York City Collective Bargaining Law

comparisons need only be made among employees in the City of
New

York.

To do so would be

in compliance, with that law

because by its language it allows for comparisons either with
New York City

employees or those

in comparable

communities.

The Taylor Law does not provide for an "either-or" option. . It
requires comparison with employees "in comparable communities"
and therefore, at least for this particular case, has a broader
scope.
Therefore I agree that although no other municipality

in

the country is precisely a "comparable community" to New York
ity,

the nearest

cities.

comparators

are .the

other twenty

largest

Yet I also accept as consequential the wages of police

o-f-fiee-r-s -i-n jurisdi-e-t-ions p-roxima-te to New

Y-o-r-k City sue-h

as

the counties of Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and the cities of
Yonkers, Newark, Elizabeth and Jersey City and the entities of
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the

Port

Authority,

the

New

York

State

Troopers

and

the

etropolitan Transit Authority.
In my judgment the most probative wage comparisons are the
direct annual salaries at the maximum levels.
The maximum salary for New York City Police Officers
present is $54,048.

at

Of the twenty next largest cities in the

country the following have maximum salary levels greater than
the City of New York as of the year 2004, as indicated:
Austin Texas

$65,012

Baltimore

$57,500

Chicago

$64,962

Columbus

$55,682

Dallas

$58,637

Jacksonville

.$55,404

Los Angeles

$71,090

Phoenix

$56,098

San Diego

$65,250

San Francisco

$76,055

San Jose

$80,255

Washington D.C.

$58,569

Therefore

more

than

half

of

the

cities

deemed

a

comparators as of the year 2004 paid direct annual salaries t
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their police officers in a greater amount than police- o-fficers
in the City of New York.
The
factor.
Abraham,

foregoing

is

without

including

a

cost

I accept the- testimony in the record
former Commissioner

Statistics,

that

costs

of

of

of Ka-the-r-ine

of the Federal Bureau
living

in

the

living

various

of Labor
cities- in

different geographical areas should be taken into consideration
in making wage comparisons.

I believe it is well acknowledged

that the cost of living in New York Qity is among the highest.
That further depresses the purchasing power of the wages paid
ksiew York City police officers in comparison with most of the
other cities.
The
increase

foregoing
for New

alone
York

would

justify

a

City Police Officers

significant
if the

wage

Goldberg

panel standard was to be attained.
With regard to the jurisdictions in geographic proximity,
i.e., Westchester, Nassau, Suffolk, Yonkers, Newark, Elizabeth
and Jersey City, and the . entities of the Port Authority,

the

MTA

to

and

New

York

State

Troopers,

there

is

relevance

onsideration of comparing their wage levels with those of the
New York City police officers.

That relevance relates not

necessarily to Section (a) of the Taylor Law but rather to the
statutory

reference

to

the public interest" (b) and to the
19

reference to "other relevant factors" (v) above.

New York City

police officers need only look across contiguous borders to see
police

officers with

less duties,

less responsibilities

less stress and danger receiving greater pay.
time

as with the Port Authority

and

From time to

and the MTA New

York City

police officers work side by side with police officers from
those

authorities

and

know

first-hand

the

pay

differences.

This can only depress morale among the New York City Police.
And a police force with morale problems is obviously

counter

productive to the very public interest and public welfare that
that

force is charged to protect.

So within the

statutory

meaning of "other relevant factors" and the "public interest"
comparisons between direct wages of the New York City Police
and

the

wages

in

the

police

of

proximate

cities

and

jurisdictions are a consequential consideration in this case.
The 2004 maximum base salaries in the following proximate
ities and entities are as indicated:
Elizabeth

$71,436

Jersey City

$71,220

Nassau County

$93,079

Newark

$69,255

Suffolk County

$84,545
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Westchester County

.

$74,125

Yonkers

$68,579

The Port Authority

$75,719

New York State Troopers

$61,106

Metropolitan Transit Authority

$63,686

I need not factor in cost of living for those cities and
entities because they are all in the same geographical area and
experience
standing
police

the

same

cost

of

living

statistics.

However,

alone the1 salary comparisons put the New York City
officer

significantly

below

the

objectives

of

the

:Oldberg Panel.
Considering the foregoing comparisons alone I am persuaded
that New York City police officers should have salary increases
of about 20 percent which

should be phased in

incrementally

over a four-year period, but subject to the other Taylor Lav\, primaril

such payment.

And for a mandated two-year contract, with the

same conditions, a 10% increase would be justified.
However,

the City claims that the foregoing

comparable

differences are sharply reduced if not totally closed by the
better benefits
namely

the

available to New York City police Officers,
pension

plan,

certain
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annuities,

disability

retirement

legislation and medical and health coverage.

I do

not find that the differential gap is appreciably narrowed by
those

particular

benefits.

Virtually

all

of

the

other

jurisdictions have a 20-year 1/2 pay retirement pension

plan.

The contribution of the New York City police officer may be
less but I do not conclude that the lesser contribution makes a
significant

difference.

The

omparable health benefits.
I see is the supplemental

other

jurisdictions

variable annuity

years but is receivable upon retirement.
not

reveal whether

have

The only significant benefit that

York City police officers Upon retirement.

does

also

other

available

to New

It vests after six
The record before me

jurisdictions

have

disability

retirement plans for presumed service connected disabilities or
injuries such as conditions of the heart, lungs and

certain

specified illnesses all presumed service connected.
But the fact is that a New York City police officer must
reach retirement age or he must become ill or injured or become
otherwise disabled in order to gain these benefits.

That means

that for most of the years of his service, in the absence of
illness or disability, he continues to work at a salary level
substantially
communities

below
or

in

the

other

police

officers

relevant

entities.

22

in
So

comparable
I

am

no

persuaded

that

the benefits

accorded

New

York

City

police

officers though obviously generous, but so restricted/, are so
different

from

other

communities

and

entities

to

which

comparisons are made as to close the pay gap referred to above.
Moreover,
variable

it

annuity

should
which

be
I

noted

have

that

stated

the

supplemental

appears

to

be

a

significant benefit indigenous to New York City police officers
represents no cost to the City,

The record indicates that it

is fully funded and has been for over a decade and that it is
.ot

anticipated

that

the

City

will

have

to

make

further

contributions to it.
I recognize that there may be other differences regarding
hours worked, the type of charts used and the relative amounts
of overtime.

But again, I do not see those differences

of

sufficient magnitude to close the pay gaps.
Moreover the argument of better benefits for New York City
police officers cuts both ways.
police
certain

officer

gets

additional

educational levels

For example in Boston, a
compensation

for

(the Quinn Bill),

New

attaining
York

City

police officers do not get a pay bonus or a pay differential
for educational attainments.
Also the cost to the City of the pension system varies
radically.

At .

times

the

assumptions to fund the plan
23

require more or less financial input from the City.

But there

have been times when the pension plans have produced available
cash for the City's budget.
pension

plan

was

so

well

In my own experience the teachers
funded

that

a

change

in

its

assumptions in 1990 permitted the City to realize substantial
cash

withdrawals

teachers.

which

supported

wage

increases

for

I know that similar actions were taken by earlier

mayoral administrations and I take arbitrable notice
fact

the

that

at present

of th«

the City Actuary may be considering a

similar action with regard to the police pension plan which may
produce additional revenue for the City.

ABILITY TO PAY
The phrase ability to pay is too simplistic.

Clearly if

the City is required to make a payment it can and will do so
including those unpredicted a.nd unbudgeted.
is

one

of

apportionment

a

"delicate
of

revenues

budgetary priorities.
balance

balance"
and,

if

between

The real question
revenues

necessary,

and

the

variations

in

The City is s-tatutorily obligated

to

its budgets each yeat and has done so

for

decades.

This has been achieved despite initial budgets which projec
large deficits.

.
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I have tremendous respect for the process and indeed the
pain the City experiences in cutting costs and developing new
sources of . revenue to insure the required balanced budget.

I

have personally experienced budgetary crises and participated
in the process of dealing with them twice in the 1970's and
again in 1990 when respectively I served in the public sector
as

an

impartial

Collective
City

and

member

Bargaining
the

of

the

New

York

City

Office

of

(and as impartial chairman between the

Firefighter

and

Fire

Commissioner of Labor Relations.

Officers

Unions)

and

as

I am aware of the mounting

costs of mandated expenses that the City cannot legally reduce
and I am aware o.f how tax increases, can discourage the location
and retention of business and professional entities in the City
and

impede

tourism.

A

"delicate balance"

accommodate fair wage increases

is

required

to

while maintaining an economy

that attracts commerce and visitors.
Obviously it is in the public interest that the

City's

police force is of top quality and properly paid, for that is
(threshold necessity for both those purposes.
On balance, in my view, the cost of running
which

unique

hospital

to

system,

sanitation,

itself pays
Medicaid,

for

an

welfare,

infrastructure,

educational
police,

the City,
system,

fire,

a

parks,

food and water protection the
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environment, housing, among many others, includes the cost of
fair and competitive wages fpr its employees.

The "delicate

balance" should leave none short changed.
All City employees are essential because they provide or
implement the .services promised, mandated and expected.

Some

like police and fire are critical to the City's welfare because
they

provide

the

essential

protections

that

permit

other

municipal services to function.
The City has ended the most recent fiscal year with what
the PBA (and the press) calls "a surplus".
"roll-over"
year.

toward balancing

the budget

The City calls it a
in the next

fiscal

Whatever called it is revenue in excess of expenses for

this fiscal year and it amounts to over three billion dollars.
At this point the City's economy is improving.
major
Street

sources

of

have

shown

escalating

the

City's

solid

revenue,

economic

real

growth

estate
with

in value with attendant tax revenue

The two
and Wall

the

former

transactions.

Wall Street revenues are volatile but traditional bonuses and
security transactions have appeared to return to good level
providing increased tax revenue.
Clearly I cannot and would not predict the future.

The

Mayor and the Budget Director, are tentative about the future
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and

that

is the prudent

approach.

I will

not

substitute my judgment for that of the Mayor,

nor

can I

other elected

officials and members of his administration in judging what the
future economy of the City will be.

Just as budget deficits

can and have been closed so too can budget surpluses

dissipate.

I am mindful that an unbalanced City budget could lead to a
take-over of the City's finances by the State Financial Control
oard.

I am also mindful that each one percent wage increase

for the police costs the City $26 million and increases
police have a * global effect" on other municipal

for

employees,

particularly firefighters and superior officers.
But my authority and duty is confined to this case and the
City's

ability

to

pay

this

Award.

The

impact

on

other

negotiations and the ability to pay the results thereof are not
before

me,

and must

be

left

to

the

collective

bargaining

process in each instance.
Therefore, in the instant case, I am satisfied that the
ity has the ability to pay the Award, which for reasons later
stated will be tempered .by specific p-roductivity
and internal savings.
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improvements

PECULIARITIES
This

standard

is unique

to

the Taylor Law

and

will

be

dealt with under the topic Bargaining History.

BARGAINING HISTORY
My observations regarding "pattern bargaining" are limited
to this case and should not, indeed may not, be construed as a
formula or ruling for any other set of negotiations.
The

City

relies

on

a

history

of

the

use

and

the

application of pattern bargaining., to resolve contracts with all
its municipal unions. I agree that that approach is commendably
designed and appropriate to create stability and equality

among

the unions to provide budgetary predictability and to eliminate
"whip

sawing",

"one-upmanship",

"leap-frogging",

and

"me

too-ism" among the unions which might otherwise be politically
compelled to outdo each other.
bargain on the
find

it

And where unions are willing to

"pattern," and as history has shown, may even

advantageous

to

do

so,

pattern bargaining

is

also

relevant and -valid.
Again due diligence would have disclosed both my views and
activities
application

regarding
by

me

"pattern
in

bargaining"

firefighter
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and

mediations

frankly,
and

its

teacher

(negotiations.
validity,

But

I

find

that

I

need

not

applicability or enforceability in

determine

its

this proceeding!

because I conclude that the pattern relied on by the City,
namely the contract

it negotiated with District Council

37,

would not, if applied on to the PBA, result in "a just and
reasonable determination of the matter in dispute" within the
meaning

of

(v)

above,

because

it

would

not

reduce

the

discrepancies in pay between the New York City police officers:
and

those

of

other

jurisdictions

that

I

have

deemed)

comparative.
The

Taylor Law mandates the panel

reasonable

determination.

to make a just and

If the DC 37 pattern were applied

the police
officers would receive no wage increase in the first
.
year, but rather $1,000 in cash; a three percent wage raise in
the second

year and a two percent increase in a third year

which is not part of the two-year contract before this Panel.
Indeed

considering

acknowledged

wage

increases

in

other

jurisdictions since 2004 it would set the New York City police
officers

fu-rthe-r behind

-the police- officers- of

those other

jurisdictions, or at best leave them as they presently stand.
Accordingly

I leave to other cases and other forums the

jquestion of whether a three-year contract with a.civilian union
under

the

New

York

City Collective
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Bargaining

Law

is

otherwise precedential or applicable to a police union under the
Taylor Law.

I also leave unanswered' questions of whether there

may not be other applicable patterns such as the wage increases
granted police officers in the other cited jurisdictions; the
specific

increases accorded police officers

the years 2002 and 2004, the precedent

elsewhere

between

of the Eischen Panel,

the first under the Taylor Law, and the arrangements in the
1980's which routinely accorded New York City police officers
wage increases greater than civilian employees.
(c)

above

reinforces

my

foregoing

conclusion

that

the

District 37 settlement would not produce a "just and reasonable
determination".
standards

Inter

for

wage

alia

it makes

increases,

explicit

'hazards

reference

of

employment",

"physical qualifications", "job training and skills".
of

a

police

officer

clearly

includes

as

greater

The job

hazards

of

employment3 specific physical qualifications and specialized job
training and skills

(including the first six months in the a

Police Academy);
Not only do I conclude that
for the determination
istinguishes

police

(c) sets- a special

of a police officer's pay but
officers

from

civilian

standard
further

employees

for

argaining unit formations.
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I take arbitral notice that sanitation men suffer more injuries but
lot the potential "life threatening" consequences of police activity.

However

I

do

find

onsider significant.
and

the

municipal

a

"pattern

of

reciprocity"

that

I

By .that I mean the practice of .the City
unions

to

negotiate

wage

and

benefit

increases above a budgeted amount in exchange for discernable
methods

of

savings.

arbitration

essentially
in

productivity

and

measurable

internal

Even if not in the last round of negotiations- or in

ischenrs

years

increased

award

(where

the

then

pattern

was

followed), that practice has been present in prior
contracts

Historically,

negotiated

as now,

by

the City has

the

City

taken

and

the

PBA.

the position

that

wages above a budgeted amount would be granted only in the case
of offsetting

increased productivity

and/or other savings. My

general acceptance of this practice should not
arties.-

surprise

the

As previously stated I have applied and affirmed it

ecause for me it represents the traditional give and take or
quid

pro

quo

of

collective bargaining.

Specifically,

diligence by the parties with regard to my- . appointment
have

disclosed

that

as

the

Labor

Relations

due
would

Commissioner

I

e-go-tiated in 199-0 an agreement with -greater wage increases for
the teachers union than for o-thers.

A 5.5% wage increase for

teachers was followed by a 4.5% increase for other civilian
unions..
the

.The difference was based on two factors...

undisputed

fact

that

the salaries
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of

suburban

First was
teachers

were discernibly higher than New York City teachers and that
City teachers were leaving for suburban jobs.

And secondly,

significantly,- there was a quid pro quo for the wage increase naniely

an adjustment of the

teacher

union pension

assumptions

funds plus

of the over

funded

additional available

funds to make up most of the wage increase.

The

state

"balance"

there was a justified wage increase for the teachers supported
by internal savings leaving

a net shortfall for the City to

fund.
This does not mean that I subscribe to the view that all
or

even, a

substantial

budgeted amount

part

is to be

of

the wage

supported by

increase

internal

above

a

savings and

productivity improvement. . Any such view would make the Taylor
Law

standard

of Ability to Pay moot and meaningless.

Indeed

that standard presupposes that a wage award may not only be in
excess of a pre-budgeted amount, but greater than productivity
and internal savings considerations.
But

again,

discle$-ed
arbitrator.

my

in

view

that
on

regard,
the

due

omnibus

diligence
role

of

would
an

have

interest

I have repeatedly stated it is not just that of a

de novo hearing officer to judge ab initio the merits of the
case.

He. is part of the. collective., bargaining process indeed
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the

final

step.

As

such he completes

for the parties the

bargaining which they could not do directly.

He was selected,

I believe, to use his expert judgment on what the parties would
have agreed to had they been able to do so themselves.
in

my

view

is what

the Taylor

Law

means

by

a

That,

*just

and

reasonable determination."
It is my judgment that if the parties had completed the
bargaining process and settled the negotiations directly the
PBA would have gained wage increases
above

the

pattern,

and

the

City

for the police officers
would

have

gained

some

rn.ethodolo.gies o.r changed, conditions of employment to produce
internal savings and increased productivity.
And that formula will be the basis of my decision in this
case.
1

am

satisfied

reciprocity,
•
p-roductivity
during

the

that

consistent

with

that

pattern

of

the Panel has the authority to introduce specific
and

internal

calendar

savings

period of

the

conditions
contract

of

employment

jurisdictionally

before u-s - namely on the last day of that contract, July 31,
2004.

Otherwise, no other method of including productivity or

internal savings would be available to the Panel, and the Panel
ould be barred (artificially I conclude)., from making a full and
alanced

Award

based

on

its assessment
53

of

all

th

ircumstances present.

Indeed,

the job of this Panel

is to

determine what the conditions of employment are and should have
been for the contract term August 1, 2002 through July 31, 2004.
So, clearly in addition to our authority to make wage increase!
retroactive,

we

have

the

same

onditions of employment during

authority

to

that period,

insert

other

including

those

that will produce internal savings and increased
even

though

implementation

thereof

cannot

be

productivity,

achieved

until

during the status quo period in the year 2005.
Ideally, because I concluded that over a four year period
at

least a 20% wage increase

was justified,

I undertook an

intensive mediation effort to produce that result.
Such an agreement would have, in my view, resulted in a
full, fair and mutually beneficial agreement, consistent with
the statutory standards and I recommend the parties reconsider
their position regarding that proposal and voluntarily revisit
it.
As to the mandated two year Award, the bargaining

unit

police of-fieer-s shall receive two 5% wage increases, the fi-rst
effective

August

1,

2002

and

effective August 1, 2003.
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the

second

5%

(compounded)

Except for the personal leave day and an increase in
rescheduled tours, the productivity improvements and
internal savings shall apply to employees newly -hired afterthe date of this Award, but made contractually effective
July 31, 2004.

Those not yet hired are not yet police

officers, and for the first six months after being hired are
essentially students .in the Academy.

They have not yet

experienced the dangers, the stress and the .responsibilities'
of incumbent police officers, and therefore at the upcoming
beginnings of their careers, shall be slotted at a lesser
wage rate for'the time in the Academy, and with an adjusted
pay schedule as set forth in the Award.
DATED:

June^ , 2005

Eric J/ Schmertz, Chairman
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The Jurisdictional dispute in this .case involves the repair, .and
restoration of walls, ceilings and columns at various locations at the
Post Office at Cadman Plaza, Brooklyn.
A hearing was held on March 9, 2005, at which time representatives
of

the

Painters

District

Council

9

Plasterers and Cement Masons, Local 530

("Painters"!' and

Operative

("Plasterers") appeared and

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitration Panel consisted of the Undersigned as Chairman and
Messrs. John Cavanagh, Robert Samella, Michael Patti and Gordon Roth.
Under

the New

York

Disputes,, the decision
Decisions

Plan

for

the Settlement

of

Jurisdictional

of the Panel is to be based on Green

or .International

Agreements,

or

if

there

be

none,

Book
on

prevailing practice in the Greater New York geographical area.
In this case both parties rely on Green Book Decision.

The Panel

finds that the .G-reen Book Decision, applicable to and determinative in
this case is Decision 191-4a which reads:

191 - 4a

The Scraping, Plaster Welding, Patching and
Re-Plastering of New and Existing Ceilings,
Walls, Beams, Columns and Staircases and

•> Skimcoating with Joint Compound or Any Other
Similar Material to the Entire Wall and
Ceiling Surfaces.
Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons Local #260 vs. Painters
District Council #9 - Henry Hudson Hotel 58* Street
The Executive Committee determined that the
work be awarded in the following manner:
1)
The Scraping, Plaster Welding, Patching
and
Re-Plastering
of
New
and
existing
Ceilings;
Walls-, ••- Beams -,
Columns
and
Staircases is the work of the Plasterers'
Local #260; -*s^«ste
2)
When Such Skimcoating is Required to
Correct
Surface
Imperfections
In
the
Preparation for Painting and/or Wall Covering
it is the work of The Painters District
Council #9.
Decision of the Executive Committee March 20, 20QQ-.
3)
In all other instances it is the work of
the Plasterers.
At

the

outset

of

the

work

involved, the

relevant

contractor

assigned it to the painters, and the painters performed the work in the
Post Office's fourth floor.
Thereafter, the contractor changed the assignment for the third
floor (and apparently for the balance of the work) and gave it to the
plasterers*
More specifically, the evidence adduced shows that the painters
did the work using methods and processes consistent with 12 of the
above-cited

Decision,

namely

"Skimcoating

to

correct

surface

imperfections in preparation for painting and/or wall covering,"
Based on the record before the Panel, the reasons for the change
in assignment

from the painters to the plasterers was because

the

contractor

determined

that

substantial

plastering

was

required

to

repair the walls, ceilings and columns, calling for plaster welding and
replastering of the existing structures.

In under taking the work, the

plasterers did substantial replastering, applied a type of mesh for
stability and then four coats of Dura bond 45, all preliminary to final
painting.

(It is undisputed that the final painting work is assigned

to and within the jurisdiction of the painters.)
The painters claim that much of the enumerated work falls within
the definition of "Skimcoating," and belongs to the painters.
There is no evidence in the record that the contractor did not
have

a

legitimate

plastering

and

imperfections."

operational

replastering

reason

rather

to

than

a

want

more

"correction

substantial
of

surface

Indeed it is clear to the Panel that the methods and

processes set forth in 51 of the Decision apply to that need, rather
than mere

Skimcoating

to

correct

surface

imperfections.

And

that

therefore if the methods and processes set forth in 11 are what is
needed for repair and restoration, the craft with jurisdiction to do it
is the plasterers.
The Panel feels compelled to make an observation, however, which
is sharply critical of the contractor involved and the plasterers.

It

is that both violated Article IV Section 2 of the New York Plan by
respectively directing and accepting a change in the assignment of the

work from the painters to the plasterers,

That Article and Section

reads:
"When any entity bound to this Plan by any
means make an assignment of work he shall
continue such assignment without alteration
unless a change is agreed to between the
contending local unions or it is directed to
reassign the work in an official decision and
•.-.--• v, award in accordance with the Plan.
(emphasis
added)
Here,, when the change was made, it was not agreed to by contending
local unions,

nor had a decision

or award in the change yet been

rendered.
For that violation, the Panel admonishes the contractor for making
the change and admonishes the plasterers for accepting it, under those
premature circumstances.
However, as an Award is now issuing, it is useless and ineffective
to attempt to remedy the violation retractively.

But the admonitions

as well as a prospective directive to henceforth comply with Article IV
Section 2, are part of this Decision.
Also, it is obvious that this case is fact-driven by the facts
cited, and the decision standing alone does not create an absolute
precedent for any other case.
However, as the Panel has relied on and interpreted Green Book
Decision 191 - 4a, that Decision remains in full force and effect as
precedent

for

jurisdictional

disputes

plasterers.

4

between

the painter

and the

For the foregoing reasons-and under the circumstances cited, the
Panel makes the following Award:
The repair and restoration of walls, ceilings
and columns at the Post Office Cadman P^aza,
Brooklyn,
is work
that belongs to the
Operative
Plasterers
and
Cement
Masons
Local 530.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

March 16, 2005

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss

OUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

